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Do better international logistics reduce trade costs, 
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magnitude of the effect depends on the country’s size. 
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firm heterogeneity and multilateral resistance to a 
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developing country would raise exports by about 36 
percent. Most countries are much smaller than average 
however, so the typical effect is 8 percent. This difference 
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trade costs relative to multilateral trade costs that matter 
for bilateral exports, and multilateral resistance is more 
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Abstract
Do better international logistics reduce trade costs, raising a developing country￿ s exports? Yes,
but the magnitude of the e⁄ect depends on the country￿ s size. We apply a gravity model that
accounts for ￿rm heterogeneity and multilateral resistance to a comprehensive new international
logistics index. A one-standard deviation improvement in logistics is equivalent to a 14% reduction
in distance. An average-sized developing country would raise exports by about 36%. Most countries
are much smaller than average however, so the typical e⁄ect is 8%. This di⁄erence is chie￿ y due to
multilateral resistance: it is bilateral trade costs relative to multilateral trade costs that matter for
bilateral exports, and mutlilateral resistance is more important for small countries.
JEL Classifications: F10, F13, F14, F17, O24
Keywords: Logistics, Trade facilitation, Gravity, Firm Heterogeneity, Multilateral Resistance
1 Introduction
Integration into the world economy is widely viewed as one of the key factors underlying the success of the
fastest growing economies (Growth Commission, 2008), yet many developing countries remain isolated.
This manifests itself in the form of relatively low international trade. Trade costs can be an important
factor that shape trade patterns. Although tari⁄s on industrial products have generally declined, non-
tari⁄ barriers to trade remain. One example of non-tari⁄ barriers is the cost of transporting products to
foreign markets, both in pecuniary terms (freight costs) and in terms of the delays experienced in moving
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jamin.nelson@bankofengland.co.uk). Please note: the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Bank of England, the Monetary Policy Committee, or the Financial Policy Committee. Manners:
The Centre for International Economics (pmanners@thecie.com.au). Behar: (abehar@imf.org), who participated in this
research while at the Trade and International Integration Unit of the Development Economics Research Group, World
Bank, for which ￿nancial support from the governments of Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom through
the Multidonor Trust Fund for Trade and Development is gratefully acknowleged; the Centre for the Study of African
Economies and St Anne￿ s College, for which funding from the Biegun Warburg Junior Research Fellowship and the United
Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council is gratefuly acknowledged. An earlier version was written as a background
paper for the 2009 World Development Report on Reshaping Economic Geography. The authors would like to thank Peter
Neary, Caroline Freund, Tony Venables, Alberto Portugal-Perez, Luis Serven and Adrian Wood; organisers and participants
at the IVIE Workshop on "Gravity, specialization and the geography of world trade: recent developments" and the CSAE
"Economic Development in Africa" Conference; and seminar participants at the University of Oxford and University of
Gothenburg.
1goods (Behar & Venables, 2011). For this reason, multilateral and donor organizations have sought to
view ￿aid-for-trade￿ packages as a promising new developmental tool (Huchet-Bourdon, Lipchitz &
Rousson, 2009).
Does such assistance work? Economists have studied the potential impact of transport and other costs
on trade using gravity since at least Tinbergen (1962).1 This paper makes a substantive contribution to
our understanding of the importance of logistics for developing countries because we use a new World
Bank index, which o⁄ers a number of advantages. It draws on a wide range of criteria, has broad country
coverage from a single source, and is based on detailed evaluations provided by logistics professionals
(Arvis, Muster, Panzer, Ojala & Naula, 2007).
This paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation and interpretation of gravity
models and hence our understanding of the importance of transport costs for trade. We develop a new
gravity model, which shows that standard approaches would produce an almost three-fold exaggeration
of the typical impact of such factors for developing countries.
We uncover this dramatic exaggeration because our novel gravity modelling approach simultaneously
accounts for two issues, namely multilateral resistance ￿rm heterogeneity. Regarding the ￿rst issue,
Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) show that it is not just bilateral trade costs, but those costs relative to
multilateral trade costs, captured by price indices, that are relevant for predicting bilateral trade ￿ ows.
In particular, imports by country i from country j, Mij, are an increasing function f(￿) of, inter alia,







Anderson & van Wincoop call the price indices multilateral resistance because they work to aggregate
trade costs across the two countries￿multiple trading partners. Omitting controls for multilateral resis-
tance (MR) can lead to biased coe¢ cient estimates. More importantly, it can lead to grossly misleading
comparative static estimates of the impact of changes in trade barriers on trade ￿ ows. This is because
changes in trade costs a⁄ect both the denominator and the numerator of the argument on the right hand
side of (1); empirical studies typically ignore the latter. Economically, for the exporter j, it is the trade
cost associated with exporting to i relative to those trade costs incurred when trading with all other
traders that matters for its exports to i. If a reduction in trade costs reduces tij but also reduces costs
associated with trading with other countries, exports by j to i will increase by relatively less compared
to the case where multilateral resistance, acting through Pi ￿ Pj, is ignored.
Trade elasticities are approximately proportional to country size because bigger countries are less
a⁄ected by MR. Intuitively, since larger countries typically trade a smaller fraction of their total output
1See Clarke, Dollar & Micco; Limªo & Venables, (2001); Wilson, Mann & Otsuki (2005); Djankov, Freund & Pham
(2010) .
2internationally, a change in international trade costs a⁄ects a proportionately smaller subset of their
total production. Accordingly, their price indices, and hence multilateral resistance, change by less.
MR therefore provides a smaller dampening e⁄ect on bilateral trade elasticities, such that the overall
elasticity net of MR is larger. Conversely, smaller countries will have smaller elasticities net of MR.
Given the skewness in the world￿ s distribution of country size, most countries are small. Therefore,
standard estimates overstate the impact of changes in logistics on bilateral trade ￿ ows for most countries.
Conversely, for a handful of large developing countries, the impact is underestimated.
The second issue was addressed by Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008), who develop a method to
account for the consequences of heterogeneous ￿rm productivity in gravity models. Firm heterogeneity
gives rise to two margins of adjustment to changes in trade barriers: the intensive margin, which captures
exports per ￿rm, and the extensive margin, which captures the number of exporting ￿rms. If ￿xed trade
costs are su¢ ciently high, no ￿rms in a given country may export to a particular destination, which
explains the zeros observed in aggregate trade data. These issues a⁄ect estimation and ignoring the
e⁄ects of trade costs on ￿rm entry results in misleading country-level comparative statics even if the
countries do trade.
Behar & Nelson (2009) develop a model which accommodates both MR and ￿rm heterogeneity. They
demonstrate the importance of these e⁄ects for comparative statics when trade costs are captured by
bilateral distance. In this paper, we adapt that approach to the case of logistics. Unlike distance,
logistics might not be exogenous, so we take potential endogeneity seriously. Further, unlike bilateral
distance, the logistics index is a country-speci￿c variable which precludes the use of ￿xed e⁄ects to
control for MR in estimation. Instead, we proxy MR terms using an adaptation of Baier & Bergstrand￿ s
(2009) method. Our approach allows us to implement this method together with Helpman, Melitz &
Rubinstein￿ s procedure to account for ￿rm heterogeneity. While the application in this paper is to
logistics, the implications fall on a wide class of country-speci￿c international trade costs.
Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature on logistics and international trade before
expanding on the importance of MR and the selection issues associated with ￿rm heterogeneity. Section
3 describes the data. The World Bank constructed its logistics performance index (LPI) using a principal
component analysis of six indicators. We describe those indicators and describe how we extract only
those that are relevant to international trade (as opposed to within-country trade) to produce what we
call the International Logistics Index (ILI).
Section 4 formalizes our gravity modelling framework, which accounts for both ￿rm heterogeneity
and MR, and derives the Baier & Bergstrand (2009) approximation for country-speci￿c trade costs in
this context. In deriving the full comparative statics that take account of MR, this section illuminates
how the trade impact varies with country size. Section 5 discusses estimation issues. Because trade
￿ ows may a⁄ect investments in logistics, logistics may be an endogenous regressor. To deal with this,
3we motivate and propose an instrumentation strategy based on the business start-up procedures in the
importing country. We brie￿ y recount the issues of MR and ￿rm heterogeneity as omitted variable bias.
While the homogeneous goods model can be estimated by OLS as in Baier & Bergstrand (2009, 2010)
or two-stage-least-squares, we also incorporate Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein￿ s (￿HMR￿ s￿ ) two-step
procedure to estimate the heterogeneous ￿rm model.
In section 6, the benchmark linear speci￿cation suggests a one standard deviation improvement in
logistics quality, which would put Rwanda on a par with Tanzania, raises exports 27%. We use our
homogeneous ￿rms model to model the impact of MR on estimation and to suggest that potential
endogeneity is not materially biasing the logistics coe¢ cient. Consistent with HMR and Behar & Nelson
(2009), accounting for ￿rm heterogeneity using the two-stage procedure produces bigger country-level
comparative statics for an average-size country than does the homogeneous goods model estimated by
OLS.
The estimates imply a one standard deviation rise in the index is equivalent to a reduction in distance
of about 14% while our simulations in section 7 indicate it would raise exports by about 36% for an
average-size country. Since the impact of MR varies by country size, we compute the elasticity for each
of our exporters. For example, because Rwanda is small, its trade response would be 1% of the response
implied by the benchmark speci￿cation. Because Brazil is big, its response would be three times the
benchmark. Averaging over all exporters, the typical e⁄ect is only 8%, which is about one ￿fth of the
average-size country e⁄ect, because most countries are small. The linear benchmark would exaggerate
this almost three-fold. Section 8 concludes that small countries have much smaller trade responses than
the average, but cautions against interpreting these results as a weak case for logistics upgrades in those
countries.
2 Literature
This section reviews two important methodological advances and brie￿ y discuss empirical work on trans-
port costs in this context.
2.1 Methodological concepts
Our approach accounts for two important insights provided by the recent gravity literature on trade ￿ ow
estimation. In particular, our estimation and comparative static exercises account for both MR and ￿rm
heterogeneity.
42.1.1 Multilateral resistance
Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) show that it is essential to account for the general equilibrium e⁄ects of
changes in trade costs on imports by country i from country j, Mij, if the trade elasticity @ lnMij=@ lntij
is to be calculated correctly. General equilibrium e⁄ects work through the price indices Pi￿Pj that enter
the bilateral gravity equation, as illustrated in equation (1) above. Since these indices aggregate the trade
costs incurred in consuming a given bundle of traded goods, Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) refer to
them as indices of multilateral resistance (MR). The e⁄ects of MR are as follows. The bilateral trade ￿ ow
between two countries depends not only on the bilateral trade barrier between them tij, but the severity
of this barrier relative to those confronted when the two countries trade with others (including domestic
trade),
tij
Pi￿Pj. It follows that the overall impact of a change in a trade barrier must account for these
potentially signi￿cant ￿ third party￿e⁄ects. The impact on Brazil￿ s exports to Peru of signing a trade
agreement depends also on whether other countries are party to that agreement. Were the agreement
bilateral only, a reduction in the Brazil-Peru trade barrier would stimulate Brazilian exports to Peru,
potentially reducing exports to third parties (e.g. Uruguay) and to itself. Were the agreement to include
Uruguay, the relevant cost for Brazilian exports to Peru is the new cost of exporting to Peru relative
to that of exporting to Uruguay; in relative terms, these costs have not changed. In this case, the only
change in relative trade costs is that between domestic and international trade, with the costs associated
with the latter falling relative to the former.
These e⁄ects are shown to be quantitatively important by Anderson & van Wincoop in explaining
the so-called US-Canada ￿ border puzzle￿of McCallum (1995). Behar & Nelson (2009) show that the
e⁄ects of MR are large for changes in trade costs that are multilateral in nature. Changes in a given
country￿ s logistics quality share some of this multilateral characteristic: if Kenya were to achieve an
improvement in its logistics, its relative trade barrier across all export destinations would be a⁄ected,
and our comparative statics on exports to a particular destination must re￿ ect this. Put di⁄erently, since
the gravity equation for bilateral trade ￿ ows is derived from a general equilibrium system, any statement
about the likely impact of this change on bilateral trade ￿ ows must take general equilibrium e⁄ects,
through MR, into account. Without doing so, comparative statics exercises will generally overestimate
the true magnitude of the response of bilateral trade ￿ ows to a change in trade costs.
Furthermore, larger countries typically trade a larger fraction of their output domestically for a given
international trade cost. For large countries, a smaller proportion of their total (i.e. domestic plus
international) trade is a⁄ected by changes in international trade costs with all destinations, which are
captured by changes in MR. As a result, MR e⁄ects are less important and hence trade elasticities are
greater for larger countries. This is ￿ Implication 1￿in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003).2
2AvW￿ s Implication 1 states that ￿trade barriers reduce size-adjusted trade between large countries more than between
small countries￿. So small countries experience smaller trade elasticities with respect to uniform changes in trade barriers.
The reason, as AvW state, is that ￿a uniform increase in trade barriers raises multilateral resistance more for a small
5There are a number of empirical approaches to controlling for MR in estimation. First, since MR
terms are country-speci￿c, they can be controlled for by including country ￿xed e⁄ects. This is not
appropriate for our purposes as we want to identify the e⁄ect of country-speci￿c logistics quality. Second,
some attempts have been made to control for MR by using price data to construct the appropriate price
indices. Data limitations are among the problems with this method. As noted in Feenstra (2004),
published price indices are typically stated relative to an arbitrary base period, making comparison
of levels impossible. Furthermore, they tend to include too many non-tradeable goods and thus fail
to capture the additional costs embedded in internationally traded goods (Anderson & van Wincoop,
2004). Third, Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) propose solving for a system of price indices together
with the gravity equation, but this involves a potentially problematic customized non-linear program.
The research community has shown that, while gravity models are popular in empirical trade, estimating
the entire non-linear system is not.3 Fourth, Baier & Bergstrand (2009) introduce a method by which
the MR terms are approximated using a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion, yielding a log-linear expression
for MR which contains exogenous variables only. These approximated MR terms can then be included
in a single linear equation. This approach has the advantage of yielding tractable comparative statics;
in particular, the role of country size in determining the appropriate comparative static e⁄ect is made
explicit, while Baier & Bergstrand show that the approximation error associated with this method is
small for the majority of country pairs.
2.1.2 Firm heterogeneity
Models of monopolistic competition with ￿rms of heterogeneous productivity predict selection into export
markets in the presence of ￿xed costs of trade. The reason is that the least productive ￿rms do not
generate pro￿ts su¢ cient to cover the ￿xed costs incurred, preventing entry into overseas markets. As
illustrated by HMR, this has at least two further implications. First, the impact of a change in a trade
barrier a⁄ects both the amount a given ￿rm exports, the intensive margin, and the number of ￿rms
that export, the extensive margin. The latter is a ￿rm selection e⁄ect. ￿ Traditional￿gravity equations
con￿ ate these two e⁄ects, whereas HMR￿ s method allows for their decomposition. Second, for ￿xed costs
su¢ ciently high, no ￿rms in a given country may ￿nd it pro￿table to export to a particular destination.
This is o⁄ered as an explanation of the ￿ zeros￿observed in bilateral trade data: many country-pairs do
not appear to trade at all. This is a country selection e⁄ect, and it induces bias in traditional gravity
estimates. HMR propose a two stage estimation procedure to construct controls for both of these e⁄ects.
In the procedure described below, we use the elements of their approach that allow us to control for the
e⁄ects of ￿rm heterogeneity and simultaneously account for MR using the Baier & Bergstrand (2009,
country than a large country￿(p. 177).
3Furthermore, this method is especially demanding when considering about 100 countries and allowing for asymmetries
in trade frictions. Bergstrand, Egger & Larch (2007) have shown that the system solution can yield complex numbers.
62010) approximation in both estimation and comparative statics.
2.2 Studies on transport costs
Behar & Venables (2010) summarise the literature on the determinants of transport costs and their
consequent impact on trade. These determinants include geography, hard infrastructure and proce-
dural/institutional characteristics of a country. For example, Limªo & Venables (2001) map information
on road, rail and phone infrastructure to shipping cost information garnered from freight forwarders.
They calculate that variation in infrastructure accounts for 40 per cent of variation in transport costs.
In a gravity framework, they ￿nd that a country improving its infrastructure from the median to the
75th percentile would increase its trade 68 per cent.
Clarke, Dollar & Micco (2004) study the importance of ports. A deterioration in port facilities and
general infrastructure from the 25th to 75th percentile is associated with a 12% rise in ocean freight
costs. They ￿nd that these costs, which are based on containerization, the regulatory environment,
seaport infrastructure and other variables also materially impact trade. Nord￿s & Piermartini (2004)
adopt a similar approach to Limªo & Venables but use more infrastructure measures. They have sepa-
rate speci￿cations for a number of indicators ￿airports, roads, telephone lines, port e¢ ciency and the
median port clearance time ￿which are estimated separately. They ￿nd all components are signi￿cant
determinants of trade, with port e¢ ciency being the most in￿ uential.
Moving beyond infrastructure, Djankov, Freund & Pham (2010) calculate that a transit delay of one
day reduced trade by 1%, which is equivalent to an additional bilateral distance of about 70km. Hummels
(2001) ￿nds that improvements in customs clearance su¢ cient to reduce waiting times by a day would
be equivalent to a 0.8 per cent reduction in ad valorem tari⁄s.
These papers make important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between trans-
port costs and trade ￿ ows. A number control for MR in estimation indirectly through the use of ￿xed
e⁄ects. However, they do not explicitly control for MR or ￿rm heterogeneity4 in estimation and com-
parative statics. As suggested by the methodological discussion in this section, this means the e⁄ects of
reforms on trade can be severely miscalculated. We are particularly concerned with grand simulations
of worldwide trade e⁄ects based on gravity models. For example, Wilson et al (2005) ￿nd that improve-
ments in all four di⁄erent trade facilitation measures would have material impacts on world trade but
the simulations are aggregates of simulations for 75 individual countries and take no account of the issues
on which we focus in this study.
4Drawing on an earlier version of our paper, Portugal-Perez & Wilson (2010) follow our estimation approach but do not
fully explore the comparative static implications.
73 Data
The 2007 Logistics Performance Index (LPI) is sourced from the World Bank5 and is constructed on a
scale from 1-5. The LPI is calculated by the World Bank using a Principal Components Analysis of six
di⁄erent sub-indicators. The indicators are listed below together with their weights in the LPI:6
1. E¢ ciency of the clearance process by customs and other border agencies (0.18);
2. Ease and a⁄ordability of international shipments (0.20);
3. The facility to track and trace shipments (0.16);
4. The timeliness with which shipments reach their destination (0.15).
5. Transport and information technology infrastructure (0.15);
6. Local logistics industry competence (0.16).
Further details of the construction of each indicator are available in Arvis et al (2007). In summary,
the index is based on more than 5,000 country evaluations by logistics professionals. The perceptions-
based measure is corroborated with a variety of qualitative and quantitative indicators. For example,
Arvis et al (2007) calculate that, on average, a one-point rise in the LPI corresponds to exports taking
three more days to travel from the warehouse to port. Unlike other studies, for example Wilson et al
(2005), the components of the index are drawn from the same source.
E¢ ciency of the clearance process by customs and other border agencies, the ease and a⁄ordability
of arranging international shipments, the ability to track and trace those shipments as well as the speed
with which they reach their destinations are directly relevant to international trade. Transport and IT
infrastructure are relevant to all trade, whether international or domestic, as is the competence of the
local logistics industry. Originally, the World Bank also collected data on a seventh component: domestic
logistics costs. This component was found to be uncorrelated with the others and was consequently
dropped by the World Bank.
Costs given by tij (i 6= j) re￿ ect international trade cost factors relative to trading within borders. As
a result, it is conceptually correct to measure those aspects of logistics which a⁄ect international trade
costs and are relevant for cross-border trade. In fact, strictly speaking, measures that a⁄ect both internal
and international costs equally have no impact on exports in fully-speci￿ed gravity models. We should
focus on the relevant components listed, but separate treatment of each component would lead to serious
5http://go.worldbank.org/88X6PU5GV0
6The weights that are used are not reported by the World Bank but can be backed out. For each country i, we have
Li = wCi where Li is i￿ s LPI score, Ci is a [6x1] vector of i￿ s component scores, and w is a [1x6] vector of the weights. We
can then use six di⁄erent country LPI scores to form a [6x1] matrix L in which row i corresponds to country i￿ s LPI score,
Li, together with each country￿ s component scores to form a [6x6] matrix C, in which column i corresponds to country i￿ s
vector of scores Ci. Then we solve L = wC for w = C￿1L to obtain the weights. We do this for a number of di⁄erent sets
of countries to ensure that the weights we calculate are una⁄ected by rounding errors.
8multicollinearity problems because the components are highly correlated. Therefore, we construct our
own International Logistics Index (ILI) based on components 1-4 using the relative weights listed. A
regression of the LPI on the ILI has an R2 of more than 0.99, so the international logistics index explains
a large proportion of the overall index. Therefore, while the ILI is conceptually more appropriate, using
it makes little practical di⁄erence.7
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full LPI and for our new International Logistics Index
(ILI). High income countries have measures of quality that are of the order of three standard deviations
higher. Approximately 70% of developing countries have an ILI of between 2 and 3, but there is still
considerable variation. Appendix Table 1 lists the values for all countries. The worst performing country
in our sample is Rwanda with an ILI value of 1.90 (although there is evidence of subsequent improvement
from various anecdotal and data sources). Singapore has the best international logistics with an ILI of
4.28. South Africa (3.66) and Malaysia (3.63) have the highest ILI values out of the developing countries.
Our interest is exports from developing countries. Based on the availability of logistics data and
possible instruments and controls, our sample consists of 88 low- and middle-income exporters. We have
116 importers regardless of income classi￿cation.8 We use merchandise exports data for 2005, using the
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. We observe 7,246 positive cross-border trade ￿ ows, 2,548 zeros and
826 instances of missing values. We therefore need to account for potential sample selection issues in our
model and econometric methodology.
We use 2005 GDP measured in constant (2000) US Dollars from the World Development Indicators.
As will become clear, each country￿ s GDP share is an important component of our analysis. We calculate
each country￿ s share of world GDP by dividing its GDP by world GDP, where world GDP is the sum of
the 116 countries in our sample.
The measure of bilateral distance that we use captures the internal distance in a country, accounts
for the distance from a number of major cities and is constructed by CEPII.9 Border data are also
sourced from CEPII. Our control variables, including dummies for whether or not two countries share
a common language,10 a common colonizer or were once the same country, as well as a dummy for a
landlocked country, are sourced from CEPII. Additional variables for identi￿cation as ￿xed export costs
or instruments are taken from the World Bank Doing Business database. These data include the number
of procedures needed to start a business, the number of days it takes to start a business and the cost of
registering to start a new business in a country. We also considered data on the number of documents
required to export or to import goods. Finally, we took the newly recoded data on religious similarity
used by Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008) from Elhanan Helpman￿ s website.
7The 2009 version of this paper used the full LPI. That paper also restricted the sample to developing countries that
are not islands or are not classi￿ed as having neighbouring countries su¢ ciently close to their major cities.
8Further discussion of why we drop rich exporters is postponed until Section A.3.
9The distance measure used is distw and is described at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
10We construct a dummy that is equal to one if two countries share either a common o¢ cial or common ethnic language.
94 Theory
We model the relationship between exports and logistics using a gravity equation. This equation has a
long and successful history in explaining bilateral trade patterns, with much of the explanatory power
coming from the two countries￿GDPs and the distance between them. Theory has subsequently pro-
vided grounding for the empirical success of the gravity model (Anderson 1979, Bergstrand 1985). The
importance of multilateral resistance was highlighted in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) (￿AvW￿ ) and
that of ￿rm heterogeneity by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). We present the full heterogeneous
￿rms model ￿rst, before showing how it can be understood as a generalisation of its homogeneous ￿rms
counterpart. Empirically, we will distinguish between the two, highlighting the role played by multilateral
resistance in each.
4.1 The Model
There are J countries, j = 1;:::;J. Within each country are monopolistically competitive ￿rms which









where x(￿) is consumption of variety ￿, contained in the set of varieties available in j, B. Let ￿ ￿ 1=(1￿￿)













Each country produces a number of varieties of measure one, with one variety per ￿rm. The unit
cost of production is a, which is ￿rm-speci￿c as in Melitz (2003). Firms draw a independently from the
identical distribution function G(a) with support [aL;aH], such that aL is the lower bound on possible
unit input requirement draws, while aH is the upper bound. We can identify a ￿rm￿ s variety with its
cost draw a: though there may be a measure of varieties with the same cost, each variety with a given
cost draw behaves symmetrically, such that they can be indexed by a alone.
There are two types of cost of exporting. The ￿rst is an ￿ iceberg￿variable trade cost tij > 1, which
we will specify further later. The second is a ￿xed cost of exporting fij > 0, fii = 0. Taken together, a
￿rm in j exporting to i producing qij units of output has a cost function given by
Cij(a) = atijqij + fij: (4)
11As in Anderson van Wincoop (2003) and most of the gravity literature, we do not allow for endogenous or excess
capacity in any economy. This precludes the use of previously idle resources for exports. It also precludes vent-for-surplus
exports, where goods are exported as a result of insu¢ cient domestic demand.
10Given demand and costs, each ￿rm chooses price so as to maximise its pro￿ts. This gives the price and










Yi ￿ fij: (6)
Sales by ￿rms in country j are only pro￿table in country i if ￿ij(a) > 0. Hence we de￿ne a productivity
cut-o⁄ aij by ￿ij(aij) = 0, which is the cost level (or inverse productivity level) below which it is
pro￿table to export. Firms with a > aij do not generate pro￿ts high enough to cover the ￿xed costs of









This gives us the extensive margin of trade. When aij is higher, the extensive margin is greater, implying
a larger subset of ￿rms exports. It rises as the income of the importing country rises, and as both ￿xed
and variable costs of trade fall. Whenever aij < aH, there will be ￿rm selection into exporting. In
particular, ￿rms with the highest variable costs will choose not to export.
The total value of imports by country i from country j is given by Mij =
R aij
aL pjqidG(a). Substituting










We then de￿ne Vij ￿
R aij
aL a1￿￿dG(a) as a term capturing the ￿rm selection e⁄ect. Note that as aij rises,
indicating that the cost level above which ￿rms ￿nd it unpro￿table to export rises, Vij rises. In other
words, as this export cut-o⁄ rises, a larger set of ￿rms export. Using this, we have bilateral exports from







Vij in equation (9), which is the same as in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), forms the basis for ac-















where we have made use of the de￿nition of Vij above. Since P
1￿￿
i aggregates trade costs, Anderson and
12We have abstracted from di⁄erences in the sets of active traders across countries. See Behar and Nelson (2009) for
discussion.
11van Wincoop interpret the price indices in the gravity equation as multilateral resistance terms, which
we discuss further below. In the presence of ￿rm heterogeneity, they are a⁄ected by Vij, the extensive
margin.
4.2 General Equilibrium
Next we assume trade balance in order to close the model. We will show that this allows us to write an
AvW style gravity equation for bilateral exports. In addition, Behar and Nelson (2009) show that trade
balance allows us to derive a gravity equation for the extensive margin. Both of these equations make
explicit the role of price indices, or multilateral resistance, in general equilibrium.
Assume trade balance for each country, such that Yj =
P
i









where Pi is country i￿ s multilateral resistance term, and Y ￿
P
h Yh is total income. In arriving at this





















In these price index equations, the sk terms represent country k￿ s GDP as a share of the total income of
all the countries. That is, si ￿ Yi=Y is country i￿ s GDP as a share of total income.
The inclusion of two price terms makes system (11)-(13) resemble that of AvW, with the crucial
di⁄erence that it allows for ￿rm heterogeneity. Reductions in trade costs a⁄ect both the numerator and
the denominator of the gravity equation. Because a reduction in tij a⁄ects the multilateral resistance
terms, the resulting increase in bilateral trade will be smaller than in the absence of changes in multilateral
resistance, all else being equal.
4.3 The extensive margin
A further implication of imposing trade balance is that equation (7) for the extensive margin also takes
a gravity-like form. In particular Behar and Nelson (2009) show that
a
￿￿1










which is a gravity equation for the cost cut-o⁄ de￿ning the extent of the extensive margin. Just as for
bilateral exports, it responds positively to the product of the trading countries￿GDPs, negatively to
12bilateral trade costs, and positively to multilateral resistance, captured by the PiPj term. Note also that
the ￿xed trade cost fij enters equation (14), such that higher ￿xed costs reduce the cost level below
which exporting is pro￿table. In this way, ￿xed costs a⁄ect the number of exporting ￿rms, but not how
much each exports. In other words, ￿xed costs a⁄ect the volume of bilateral exports, but only indirectly
through their impact on aij, which determines Vij. This is important for the identi￿cation strategy in
the empirical section.
Further, (14) makes explicit the role of multilateral resistance on the extensive margin. Just as
for bilateral trade ￿ ows, a multilateral increase in trade costs increases both the numerator and the
denominator of (14); the e⁄ect of trade costs on the price indices in the denominator therefore acts to
mitigate the direct e⁄ect in the numerator. Just as AvW show for bilateral trade ￿ ows, comparative
statics on the extensive margin will be misleading where the latter e⁄ect is accounted for, but the former
is not.
Imposing an assumption about the distribution of productivities grants us further analytical tractabil-




￿ Pareto(k); a 2 [aL;aH];
where aL and aH de￿ne the support of the distribution, consistent with above, and k is the shape














a. Using this, we write the
















such that whenever aij < aL, or no ￿rms in j generate pro￿ts su¢ cient to cover the ￿xed costs of
exporting, Vij = 0. From (11), this generates zero bilateral exports from j to i when aij < aL. When
will this scenario arise? Following HMR, one way to operationalise (15) is to consider the pro￿ts of the
￿rm in j with the lowest variable costs aL. If this ￿rm does not ￿nd it pro￿table to export to i, then no










It then follows that
Vij > 0 i⁄ Zij > 1: (17)
Zij is HMR￿ s latent variable. It is unobserved, but can be estimated using a combination of the distri-
butional assumption on ￿rm-speci￿c costs a; and observable variables such as GDP and trade costs. A
13See, inter alia, Chaney (2008) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), who use Pareto distributed ￿rm productivity
in theoretical and empirical work.
13further consequence of the trade balance assumption is that HMR￿ s Zij can be written as









That is, the latent variable can be decomposed into two components: multilateral resistance, and a
component e Zij independent of prices. Next, using (14), (18) and (19) allows us to relate the extensive



















where ￿ ￿ k￿￿+1




. This again makes explicit the point that MR a⁄ects the
extensive margin too; increases in trade costs will decrease e Zij, but will increase PiPj, mitigating the
net e⁄ect on the latent variable Zij and hence on the extensive margin Vij.
Taking logs of (11) yields the equation we work with for estimation and comparative statics. Specify-
ing trade costs (￿ ￿1)lntij = ￿dij ￿ ￿
2(Li +Lj), where dij is log bilateral distance and Lk is a measure
of country k￿ s export logistics (such that trade frictions fall with better logistics) gives14
mij =   + yi + yj ￿ ￿dij +
￿
2
(Li + Lj) + wij + ln(PiPj)
￿￿1 ; (22)
where   is a constant and where the role of the 1









which is the term containing the extensive margin. This term contains zij = lnZij, which since Zij =
e Zij (PiPj)
￿￿1, is
zij = ￿ + yi + yj ￿ ￿dij +
￿
2
(Li + Lj) ￿ lnfij + (￿ ￿ 1)ln(PiPj); (23)
in which ￿ is a constant. As in (22), better international logistics increase the extensive margin of
bilateral trade ￿ ows.
14Dummies can be included on trade frictions to capture di⁄erences across subsets of countries if necessary. See A.3.
14Accounting for MR requires a way of dealing with price index terms. We will use an extension of
the approach taken by Baier and Bergstrand (2009), set out in Behar and Nelson (2009), which is a
workhorse in macroeconomics: Taylor￿ s method. In particular, Behar and Nelson show that when the
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: (24)
This provides a tractable and intuitive way of controlling for multilateral resistance, and can be used
for computing comparative statics. Equation (24) extends Baier and Bergstrand￿ s (2009) approximated
MR term to the case of ￿rm heterogeneity. The expression includes not only an intensive margin e⁄ect
(￿ ￿ 1)lntij in each component of the MR term, but also an extensive margin component through ￿e zij.
This approximated MR term shares with BB￿ s method the advantage of yielding analytical tractability
and a clear intuition for the comparative statics e⁄ects we subsequently compute. It also preserves a role
for asymmetries in trade costs.
(24) shows that MR can be conveniently decomposed into three terms. The ￿rst of these captures
world trade resistance, which averages the importing MR of all importers from j. When this world
resistance term is higher, world trade in general is subject to higher trade frictions, reducing bilateral
trade all else being equal. The second two terms in (24) are i￿ s importing MR and j￿ s exporting MR
respectively. When either of these two terms is high, trading with other countries in the world trade
system is subject to high trade costs, encouraging i and j to trade with each other instead. This clearly
captures the idea that it is relative trade costs that matter in determining bilateral trade ￿ ows. For
example, when
P
h sh [(￿ ￿ 1)lntih ￿ ￿e zih] is large, all exporters to i incur high trade costs in trading
with i. Country i therefore incurs relatively small trade costs in importing from j, raising exports from
j to i.
Substituting our expression for trade frictions (￿ ￿ 1)lntij = ￿dij ￿ ￿
2(Li + Lj) into (24) allows us






































sh(Ll + Lh) ￿
X
h6=i
sh(Li + Lh) ￿
X
l6=j

























(Li + Lj) + ￿MR
f
ij + wij; (29)
gives our heterogeneous ￿rms gravity equation accounting for MR.16;17
4.4 Special case: homogeneous ￿rms
As heterogeneity disappears, this set-up reduces to a simple homogeneous ￿rms model. To see this, note
that, as (i) all ￿rms export and (ii) the support of the distribution of ￿rm productivities collapses, such










In that case, the gravity equation is simply
mij =  








(Li + Lj); (30)
16Note that MR
logistics
ij can be simpli￿ed to MR
logistics





; where L is the average international
logistics quality.













sh(yl + yh) ￿
X
h6=i






























which when aij = aH (all ￿rms export) is
Vij =
k







Then let f(aH) = ak￿￿+1
H ￿ ak￿￿+1
L and g(aH) = ak
H ￿ ak
L, so f0(aH) = (k ￿ ￿ + 1)ak￿￿
H and g0(aH) = kak￿1
H , such that



















so for Vij > 0, limaH!aL Vij = a1￿￿
L .
16where the constant  
0 now contains an additional term re￿ ecting the magnitude of aL. This is useful
in that we can assess empirically the impact of allowing for ￿rm heterogeneity in our application, and
compare the empirical implications of this modelling feature to the quantitative impact of accounting
for multilateral resistance.
4.5 Comparative statics
4.5.1 Homogeneous ￿rms model
Next we consider comparative statics. In the simplest case, ￿rm heterogeneity is abstracted from. Then














f1 + 2sj (1 ￿ sj) ￿ sj ￿ (1 ￿ sj)g (31a)
= ￿sj (1 ￿ sj) (31b)
￿ sj￿: (31c)
The ￿rst term in the f￿g brackets in (31a) gives the partial equilibrium e⁄ect in the absence of MR.
The third term is the e⁄ect operating through the importer￿ s multilateral resistance, which falls by the
exporter￿ s GDP share, dampening the partial equilibrium e⁄ect. The fourth term is the exporter￿ s mul-
tilateral resistance, which falls across all export destinations relative to domestic trade. The proportion
of j￿ s export demand this covers is 1 ￿ sj. The second term is the e⁄ect operating through ￿world
resistance￿ , which captures how costly international trade is relative to domestic trade for all countries.
sj (1 ￿ sj) enters twice because, on the one hand, it makes j export more directly. On the other hand,
it also makes it import more, which through trade balance makes it export more.20 The net general
equilibrium e⁄ect after one allows for terms to cancel is ￿sj (1 ￿ sj). It illustrates the diversion away
from domestic trade and towards international trade as international trade costs fall.
Simplifying (31a) clearly shows that the net comparative static e⁄ect is not ￿
2, but something much
smaller. The comparative static e⁄ect (31c) is increasing in country size. This is consistent with Anderson
& van Wincoop (2003), who found that smaller countries experience smaller comparative static e⁄ects
because they are more a⁄ected by MR. As discussed in section 2.1.1, the reason for this is that smaller
countries consume a smaller proportion of their produce domestically and export a larger proportion of
their products abroad. More of their trade is international trade, so more is subject to international
19If both the importer and exporter were to improve logistics, the e⁄ect at the intensive margin, not accounting for MR,
would be ￿:
20If we do not specify importer logistics as part of the bilateral trade cost function, then we end up with the same
comparative static e⁄ect, except we attribute it entirely to the ￿rst world resistance e⁄ect. It is impossible to identify how
much of the e⁄ect is due to "exports" and how much is due to "imports", but the Anderson & van Wincoop cost symmetry
assumption implies it is half each.
17trade costs, so MR has more of an e⁄ect.
Speci￿cation (30) allows one to interpret the coe¢ cient on (Li + Lj) as the e⁄ect of an improvement
in international logistics quality on trade for an average-size country, for which sj = 1
n. Thus, the










￿ ^ ￿: (32)
4.5.2 Heterogeneous ￿rms model
In the presence of ￿rm heterogeneity, comparative statics must take into account three e⁄ects. As well as
the intensive margin and MR, there is the e⁄ect of ￿rm heterogeneity. In particular, a change in logistics
quality must account for




2. the MR e⁄ect occurring at the intensive margin,
(￿￿1)@ lnPiPj
@Lj = ￿￿
2(1 ￿ 2sj + 2s2
j);
3. the e⁄ect at the extensive margin, which also has bilateral and multilateral components, where
@zij









￿sj (1 ￿ sj):
As in the homogeneous case, combining e⁄ects (1) and (2) gives ￿sj (1 ￿ sj) (cf. equation (31)).














e￿^ xij ￿ 1
￿
: (33)
The gravity parameter ￿
2 is the e⁄ect at the intensive margin, not accounting for MR. The ￿rst square
bracket is the adjustment for MR. The second square bracket, which exceeds unity, is the ampli￿cation
brought about by allowing for the e⁄ect at the extensive margin. Note that ignoring this term gives the
intensive margin provided we have controlled for wij in estimation in our heterogeneous ￿rm model. If
we have not controlled for ￿rm selection and we estimate a homogeneous ￿rms model, then the ￿rm and
country-level response is the same: in this case there is no ￿rm entry or exit into overseas markets and
all ￿rms experience the same trade elasticity.
In the heterogeneous model, the ^ ￿ coe¢ cient on (Li + Lj) still forms the approximate intensive margin
change for an average-size country, while ^ ￿ ￿e
￿^ xij
e
￿^ xij￿1 gives the approximate extensive margin change for an















To place our model in a stochastic framework, we allow for measurement error in the reporting/recording
of trade ￿ ows and unobserved trade costs. A necessary condition for consistent estimates is that the
error term is Independently and Identically Distributed (IID). This section will discuss potential reasons
why the IID assumption might not hold. It also discusses the dropping of high-income exporters from
our sample.
5.1 Endogeneity bias
The IID assumption rules out reverse causation. There is ambiguity regarding the relationship between
logistics and trade. Our theoretical framework describes a unidirectional impact of improved logistics on
exports. However, it may be that higher trade volumes stimulate the construction of new infrastructure
and the introduction of more e¢ cient clearance technologies: the marginal value of investments in trade
facilitating measures may be higher if exports are high, while some aspects of the logistics technology are
subject to scale economies and thus only worthwhile at very high volume. This could cause an upward
bias in the estimated coe¢ cient. On the other hand, high trade volumes may increase the strain on
the system, leading to queues at the border and longer customs processing times (Djankov et al, 2010),
and causing downward bias in the estimates. The instrumental variables (IV) speci￿cations we include
provide a check for robustness. For e⁄ective IV estimation, we need instruments that have explanatory
power (they are su¢ ciently correlated with logistics) but are exogenous (uncorrelated with exports except
through logistics). While explanatory power can be checked by examining the ￿rst-stage IV regression
for logistics, the validity of the instrument is ultimately not testable. We tried a number of plausible
candidates.
5.2 Omitted multilateral resistance terms
While we have emphasised the importance of multilateral resistance for comparative statics, it can have
an e⁄ect on estimation. If we have the bilateral trade cost variables but omit their multilateral resistance
analogues, these terms would be in the error term. By construction, this would make the error term
correlated with the regressors, would invalidate IID and lead to biased estimates of the coe¢ cients. We
construct multilateral resistance terms for all bilateral variables and include importer-equivalents for all
country-speci￿c variables. Following Baier & Bergstrand (2009,2010), we perform estimation with the
equality restrictions implied by (30) imposed. For example, we include the sum of exporter and importer
logistics as a single variable and include dij ￿ MRdist
ij as a single variable. Furthermore, we construct
the MR terms by taking simple averages, which assumes s = 1=n for all countries (see Appendix A.2).
Melitz (2008) also uses simple averages and applies it to the context of both bilateral and country-
19speci￿c variables.21 We emphasize that taking the simple mean is for the purposes of estimation and not
comparative statics (see Baier & Bergstrand, 2010).
5.3 Firm-heterogeneity
The heterogeneous ￿rms model also indicates potential violation of the IID assumption. Leaving out
the control for the proportion of ￿rms exporting would lead to omitted variables bias. Furthermore, the
model suggests how country-selection into trade is a function of the variables of interest and a potential
source of sample selection bias. To address these issues and implement the heterogeneous ￿rms model,
a two-step procedure is needed.
In the ￿rst stage, we estimate a probit model for the probability that country j exports to i, denoted
￿ij. Letting Tij be unity when exports from j to i are observed and zero otherwise, we write
￿ij = Pr(Tij = 1jObservables,unobservables): (35)
Predicted values of ￿ij are used to generate normalized predicted values for zij, ^ zij (cf. equation (23)).
The predicted probability ^ ￿ij can be used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio ^ ￿ij, which controls for
the country selection e⁄ect. Furthermore, HMR show how ^ zij and ^ ￿ij can be used to account for ￿rm
selection. De￿ne the propensity to export b xij ￿ ^ zij + ^ ￿ij, which is a positive function of ￿ij. This is an
estimate of the latent variable zij as a function of both observable and (an estimate of) unobservable
trade frictions. As above, attaching a Pareto distribution to ￿rm productivities allows us to map b xij to a
consistent estimate of the number of ￿rms pro￿table enough to export. We include this b wij = ln(e￿b xij￿1),
together with ^ ￿ij, in the second stage of our regression, modifying (29) to yield












e￿^ xij ￿ 1
￿
+ ￿￿^ ￿ij: (36)
We estimate this second stage using non-linear least squares and use bootstrapped standard errors
to allow for the fact that we have generated regressors in the second stage.22 The ￿rst stage and
homogeneous goods models use standard errors clustered by country-pair. For reliable identi￿cation,
we need to have one variable in the probit equation that is not in the second stage. Our theoretical
framework suggests variables that a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s ￿xed costs (fij) of exporting but not its variable costs.
Our ￿rst-stage probit only di⁄erentiates between zeros and ones and ignores the missing observations.
Baranga (2009) suggests this may induce further selection bias. Addressing these concerns, we also ran
speci￿cations in which we estimated a preliminary probit for missing variables. Including an analogous
21We thank an anonymous referee for the reference. Melitz￿ s derivation of MR terms in the country-speci￿c case is similar
to ours (cf Melitz￿ s equation 7 and footnote 10) but not exactly the same. This is in part due to di⁄erences in treatment
of the country-speci￿c variable when i = j.
22We perform 50 replications. Furthermore, we reject draws that spawn theoretically illegitimate values for b xij and ^ ￿ij:
20inverse Mills ratio in the "￿rst-stage" probit for positive trade yielded a coe¢ cient of virtually zero with
a p-value of close to unity. This suggests ignoring missing values is not an issue for our data. Results
are available on request.
6 Results
This section discusses the estimation results. In a homogeneous-￿rm setting, we start with benchmark
speci￿cations. We discuss the impact of MR on the estimates and then we assess potential endogeneity.
Thereafter, in a heterogeneous-￿rm setting, we show the results of our two step procedure. The results in
this section estimate trade ￿ ows using developing countries. It is quite plausible that the logistics issues
faced by richer exporters di⁄er from those faced by poorer exporters such that the gravity parameter ￿
may di⁄er. Nonetheless, we explore the implications of estimation based on the fuller sample in Appendix
A.3. As discussed there, we were not satis￿ed with the extent to which an interaction between logistics
and a developing country dummy captured di⁄erences by income group. More importantly, our results
were not as reliable or robust when estimated on the full sample, especially when trying to employ IV
methods or the HMR procedure. It is important to stress that, although we estimate trade ￿ ows using
developing countries only, we calculate multilateral resistance terms by summing over all 116 countries
and perform comparative statics accordingly.23
Homogeneous ￿rms In Table 2, column 1 presents a standard augmented gravity model. The signs of
the coe¢ cients are as one would expect. In particular, the international logistics coe¢ cient (on Li +Lj)
is signi￿cant with a value of 0:606. To get a sense of magnitude, we calculate the e⁄ect on exports of a
one standard deviation rise in the ILI. This modest 0.4 unit rise would for example put Rwanda￿ s logistics
on a par with nearby Tanzania￿ s, make Bulgaria￿ s like Romania￿ s or place Brazil just above Argentina.
Such a rise would raise exports e0:6
￿0:4 ￿ 1 = 27%. Alternatively, we can use the coe¢ cients on logistics




0:4 = 17%: In column 2, we






example - and the logistics coe¢ cient is 0:597: More generally the coe¢ cients are quite similar. While
the in￿ uence of MR on estimation is negligible in this case, we will see later that its comparative static
impact will be very important.
Column 3 presents the second stage of a two-stage-least-squares estimation by instrumental variables,
where the ￿rst stage has the number of procedures needed to start a business in the importer instru-
23For comparative statics, a prior version of this paper multiplied by only the 88 countries for which we estimate trade
￿ows. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out it is more appropriate to proxy for the whole world with
the full sample of countries in our dataset.
Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) have a two-country model as well as a multi-country model. In the former, they use
only US and Canada information. In the latter, they estimate bilateral trade ￿ows using only Canadian Provinces and US
states but include data from another twenty industrial countries in their system of price equations. Our approach here is
analogous to their multi-country model.
21menting for logistics (Li + Lj). A priori, we expect this to be correlated with our logistics variable,
because both variables (speci￿cally, the importer component of logistics) share common institutional
bureaucratic features. Furthermore, while the exporter￿ s business start-up procedures may or may not
be correlated with exports, there is no good reason to believe the importer￿ s business start-up procedures
should be directly related to the exporter￿ s exports. In the ￿rst stage, the instrument was signi￿cant with
a p-value of less than 0.0015 (using a t-test or F-test). There is only one instrument so no overidentifying
restriction to test.24 The coe¢ cient on logistics in column 3 is 0:437, which is a bit lower than in column
3, but the speci￿cation was deemed insigni￿cantly di⁄erent by a Hausman test.
We also have a speci￿cation where we have the sum of procedures in both exporter and importer as
one instrument and their product as another. Both variables have explanatory power in the ￿rst-stage
and the overidenti￿cation test was insigni￿cant (with a p-value of 0.17). Thus, conditional on one of
these instruments being valid, we can legitimately exclude both. This condition cannot be tested, but
our regression of the residuals on the exogenous variables yielded individually and jointly insigni￿cant
terms. This generates a coe¢ cient of 0:697 on logistics, which was also deemed insigni￿cantly di⁄erent
by a Hausman test.25
The evidence is against the OLS coe¢ cient being incorrectly estimated due to endogeneity. Column
4 produces an insigni￿cantly lower estimate, while column 5 represents estimates which were insigni￿-
cantly higher. We prefer to use the column 2 estimates, which lie inbetween, for the homogeneous ￿rm
comparative static exercise we will perform later. However, we also need to take into account another
source of bias, namely ￿rm heterogeneity and country selection.
Heterogeneous ￿rms In Table 3, we produce the results which account for ￿rm- and/or country-
selection. In column 1, the probit model yields all the expected signs. We note logistics a⁄ects the
probability that a country exports, which in our framework means logistics a⁄ect ￿xed costs. In partic-
ular, we note that the Samecountry variable is also signi￿cant.
In column 2, we present the second stage of the Heckman two-step procedure, where we have excluded
the Samecountry variable.26 The logistics coe¢ cient is somewhat higher than in Table 2. Analogous
to HMR, this is because failure to account for country selection induces a negative correlation between
logistics quality and the error term, because a low logistics quality means that unobserved trade frictions
must be low on average for countries to be observed as trading pairs. This in turn induces a downward
24We ran an alternative speci￿cation in which we include both importer and exporter procedures as separate instruments.
This produces a coe¢ cient of 0.49. Informatively, an auxilliary regression of the residuals found that the exporter logistics
variable is signi￿cant while the importer￿ s was not.
25We experimented with alternative variables and functional form, including the importer￿ s documentation for imports,
the importer￿ s documentation for exports, the importer￿ s costs of starting a business, the importer￿ s duration in days
of starting a business and combinations thereof. These tended to produce signi￿cant coe¢ cients in residuals regressions
and/or signi￿cant overidenti￿cation tests as well as instances of insu¢ cient explanatory power in the ￿rst stage.
26We also ran a just-identi￿ed model with all ￿rst-stage variables included in the second stage. The results were very
similar. We also attained similar results using the number of regulations in the ￿rst stage probit and excluding those from
the second stage.
22bias in the homogeneous logistics coe¢ cient. However, the Inverse Mills Ratio is insigni￿cant, which
suggests that country-selection is not an important issue in our application.
In column 3, we implement the full HMR procedure to account for both country- and ￿rm-selection.
When accounting for both ￿rm and country selection, it becomes especially important to exclude a
variable from the second stage. Economically, this is a variable which a⁄ects the ￿xed costs of exporting,
but not the variable costs (Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein, 2008). We omit the Samecountry variable
but preserve the MR component to be consistent with the theoretical speci￿cation (equation 36).27
This speci￿cation assigns low coe¢ cients to logistics and distance but a high estimated ￿. This would
indicate that the in￿ uence of logistics is only through the extensive margin. However, as in column 2,
the Inverse Mills Ratio is still insigni￿cant, so the next two speci￿cations countrol for ￿rm-selection but
not country-selection.
In column 4, we follow Manova (2008) by excluding no explanatory variables from the second stage
but dropping the Inverse Mills Ratio. This produces a logistics coe¢ cient of 0:489 and a ￿ of 0:307.
Excluding the Samecountry variable from column 5, the logistics coe¢ cient is 0:445 and ￿ is 0:416.28
Column 5 is our preferred speci￿cation but we stress that, provided we exclude the Inverse Mills Ratio,
our results are not materially a⁄ected by the choice of exclusion variable, for example religious similarity
or the number of procedures or days needed to start a business as used by HMR. Column 5 implies a
one standard deviation improvement in the ILI is equivalent to a 14% reduction in distance.29
Consistent with HMR, allowing for ￿rm heterogeneity produces lower coe¢ cients. Comparing our two
benchmarks for example, the homogeneous coe¢ cient (column 2 of Table 2) is 0:597 while the ￿rm-level
coe¢ cient (column 5 of Table 3) is 0:445: However, this does not mean that the country-level e⁄ect is
smaller.
Table 4 in fact demonstrates much higher bilateral country-level e⁄ects, which are calculated for each
country-pair by allowing for the extensive margin (cf. equation (34)). For reference, the ￿rst column
presents values from the homogeneous ￿rms model. This is followed by the ￿rm-level coe¢ cient from our
preferred heterogeneous ￿rms model. The subsequent values reveal substantial variation in the extensive
margin and hence the country-level e⁄ect; for example the standard deviation is 0:147. We see that
even the minimum value of 0:648 is greater than that implied by the homogeneous model. Therefore,
the homogeneous ￿rm model has in this application underestimated the country-level e⁄ect of logistics
27Excluding the MR component made no di⁄erence. Furthermore, as done by HMR, we attempted speci￿cations which
exclude religious similarity or the procedures or days needed to start a business. The speci￿cations yielded a large sig-
ni￿cantly negative Inverse Mills Ratio, a GDP coe¢ cient well below unity and a positive distance coe¢ cient. These all
suggest excluding these variables from the second stage is not appropriate for our dataset. We also attempted export
documentation and/or import documentation in the importer and/or exporter, or combinations theoreof. While these
are a priori highly plausible candidates for ￿xed but not variable trade costs, the results suggested they are not reliable
identifying variables.
28We do not discuss the signi￿cance of this variable because it must be non-zero for a well-de￿ned gravity model, so it
cannot be zero under the null hypothesis. Furthermore, the term ln(e￿^ xij ￿ 1) is only the ij￿speci￿c compnent of !. The
rest of it is subsumed in the constant.
29Because all trade costs are equally a⁄ected by ￿rm heterogeneity and multilateral resistance, we still calculate this by
taking the quotient of the logistics and distance coe¢ cients.
23for all countries. The source of variation across country-pairs and hence across income-groups is driven
by variations in the extensive margin. Di⁄erentiation of (34) with respect to ^ xij would show that the
extensive margin e⁄ect is higher for countries with a lower value of ^ xij; which implies the extensive
margin e⁄ect is higher for those who tend to have a lower proportion of ￿rms exporting. This in turn
implies, for example, that more distant countries with lower logistics quality would have a bigger increase
in bilateral exports, ceteris paribus.
The average country-level e⁄ect of 0:882 on bilateral trade is almost 50% higher than that implied
by the homogeneous ￿rms model. It also suggests that the country-level e⁄ect is on average half due
to the intensive margin and half due to the extensive margin. In other words, approximately half the
country-level e⁄ect is due to new ￿rms entering the export market.
7 Simulations: total country-level exports
To understand the e⁄ects of logistics on a country￿ s total exports in the heterogeneous goods model, we
must aggregate over the bilateral elasticities calculated in Table 4. It is also about time we recognized
the importance of MR more explicitly by factoring in the actual size of the country. The distribution
of world GDP is highly skewed. China accounts for about 5% of world output. This is about the same
as the next three biggest developing countries combined (Brazil, India and Mexico). This 10% share
exceeds that of the other 84 developing countries in our sample! Mean GDP is about seven times as big
as the median and, in our full sample, the world mean for non-African countries is almost forty times as
big as that for African countries.
Because of multilateral resistance, this extreme skewness means the e⁄ect on a particular country or
subset of countries can be very di⁄erent to the average. We illustrate the importance of this issue in a
homogeneous setting before performing the aggregation necessary if ￿rms are heterogeneous. We do not
allow for country-level entry in the simulations. HMR attribute very little of the rise in international trade
to the formation of new bilateral relationships. Furthermore, the Inverse Mills Ratio was insigni￿cant in
our application.
Homogeneous ￿rms To calculate the e⁄ect for a particular country j, equations (31) and (30) imply
that we multiply the logistics coe¢ cient by n to get ￿ and then multiply that by sj (1 ￿ sj): Using the
estimate ￿
n = 0:597 and n = 116 gives ￿ ￿ 69: China￿ s share of world GDP is 5:34% so its value of
sj (1 ￿ sj)￿ = 3:5 . Table 5 has the (semi-)elasticities for all 88 developing countries. China￿ s value
is at the top left. As we move down, we see the steep fall in size as measured by the share of world
GDP. As a result, the homogeneous elasticities fall dramatically. Many semi-elasticities are less than
1%; the bottom right produces elasticities of less than 0:1%. Clearly, the elasticity depends on whether
you are the Comores or China. Calculating this for all 88 exporters, we average over these to get the
24mean elasticity of 0:16: This value, which we call the "typical" elasticity, is about a quarter of that for
a country of average-size 1
n: Argentina￿ s share of GDP is only slightly higher than the average (1=116)
and its comparative static e⁄ect is accordingly only slightly higher than that given by the homogeneous
coe¢ cient. China￿ s elasticity is more than twenty times bigger than the typical elasticity. Similarly,
Brazil, India and Mexico all have elasticities more than double those implied if we ignore MR. On the
other hand, 82 out of 88 countries are below average, so ignoring MR typically overestimates the elasticity
and sometimes does so by a large amount. While this calls for estimation of elasticities at a country-level,
we are not necessarily saying that ^ ￿ is inappropriate: by implicitly giving a greater weighting to bigger
countries, it may be a good summary measure.
Heterogeneous ￿rms For each exporter, the elasticity varies by importer when ￿rm heterogeneity is
included. Therefore, for each exporter, we sum the bilateral response over all its importers, weighting

















e￿^ xlj ￿ 1
￿￿
: (37)
The average-size total country response is 0:766, which is higher than the homogeneous ￿rms benchmark
that did not account for MR in estimation (0:606). The value of 0:766 implies a one standard deviation
improvement in the ILI would raise exports by e0:297 = 36%. To incorporate MR fully in comparative
statics, we follow analogous procedures to before and compute
￿j = sj (1 ￿ sj)
@mj
@Lj
￿j is a key object of interest and forms the basis for our main substantive result. We expect bigger
exporters to have smaller elasticities in general because they have a lower extensive margin e⁄ect, but
this e⁄ect is empirically dominated by the MR e⁄ect. Overall, the biggest countries have the biggest
elasticities, which would be true for all country-speci￿c determinants of trade costs, not just logistics.
Alongside the homogeneous model elasticities, Table 5 presents the heterogeneous model elasticity
for each country with respect to an improvement in its own logistics. The average value of ￿j across 88
exporters is 0:185, which implies a one standard deviation rise in a country￿ s ILI would raise exports by
7:67% or about 8%: Recall that such an improvement would place Brazil on a par with Argentina next
door. Brazil￿ s size means its calculated response of 84% is more than triple the benchmark of 27%. More
dramatically, Rwanda￿ s small size means its trade response of 0:028% would be barely one per cent of
the benchmark.
By way of summary, we make two ￿nal comparisons using estimates we have already presented. Our
30We did this with actual trade ￿ows but predicted trade ￿ows produced similar results.
25￿nal estimate of the response to a one standard deviation improvement in logistics quality for a country
of average size is 36%. This is somewhat higher than the 27% response implied by our benchmark
model in column 1 of Table 2. However, this masks the huge variation in response by country and, due
to the skewed distribution of country size, is not typical. Averaging over each country-level response,
our measure of the typical response is only 7:67%, which is about one quarter of the e⁄ect implied by
the benchmark. This di⁄erence is an order of magnitude greater than the estimation issues with which
empirical economists are typically concerned.
8 Concluding discussion
We have seen consistent evidence that an exporter￿ s logistics increase exports. Our preferred heteroge-
neous speci￿cation indicates that the elasticity of total exports with respect to a change in logistics for
a country of average size is 0:74. However, most countries are much smaller than the average, so most
countries have much smaller e⁄ects. After calculating elasticities for all countries, the typical (mean)
elasticity is only 0:185. This implies a one standard deviation improvement in logistics would raise
exports by 8%.
By contrast, the benchmark linear model would have produced estimates of 27% ￿a ￿ve-fold exag-
geration. The exaggeration for Rwanda would have been 100-fold, for example. The chief reason for
these exaggerations is that standard methods ignore the general equilibrium e⁄ects operating through
multilateral resistance, which are stronger for smaller countries and hence dampen their trade responses
by more. In contrast, a handful of large countries have elasticities that are much higher than that given
by the benchmark. To be clear, our critique focusses on the comparative static impacts on trade. State-
ments about one transport cost expressed in other trade cost equivalents are generally still valid because
MR a⁄ects all trade costs equally.
One of our key results is that economically small countries have small export elasticities. When
evaluating the case for logistics upgrades, this result should be considered alongside the costs of improving
logistics, which are also likely to increase with country size. Upgrading international logistics for the
whole of Brazil requires far more resources than upgrading in Rwanda.31 This is an important factor in
the context of broader evaluations of net welfare gains and evaluations of aid-for-trade on a country-by-
country basis.
While we have emphasised the importance of multilateral resistance for individual country responses,
a summary view is arguably better captured by the elasticity for the average-size country, where bigger
countries are implicitly given a bigger weighting. Here, it is important to stress that allowing for ￿rm
31Furthermore, the functional form we have chosen does not readily allow for decreasing returns, nor does it allow for
variations in the gravity parameter ^ ￿.This is standard in the literature. However, this parameter may vary across countries
because the products they export may di⁄er (Djankov et al, 2010) or because the elasticity of substitution is not constant.
Even so, it would take very large variations in ^ ￿ to extinguish the relationship between size and the general equilibrium
response. More generally, a proper evaluation of welfare gains and losses would be needed.
26heterogeneity generates a higher trade response. A one standard deviation improvement gives a trade
response of 36% for an average-size country, which is higher than given by the benchmark. For any
country, such an improvement is equivalent to a 14% reduction in distance. Nonetheless, the cross-
country variation in trade responses is overwhelmingly driven by di⁄erences in multilateral resistance.
Our study has been of a unilateral improvement by a country, but a global analysis requires an
investigation of multilateral improvements. Wilson et al (2005) simulate the e⁄ect of bringing all countries
with below-average measures of trade facilitation half way up to the global average. Such a simulation
is beyond the scope of this paper, but one that takes proper account of ￿rm heterogeneity and especially
MR would be an informative enterprise.
A Appendix
A.1 Deriving equation 11
Trade balance requires Yj =
P
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27A.3 Dropping high-income exporters
We are interested in the less developed countries. Nonetheless, we explore the implications here of
performing estimates on the full sample and including a dummy for developing countries. Theoretically,
if we want to capture a di⁄erent e⁄ect of a trade friction on a developing versus rich country, our equation
becomes
mij =   + yi + yj ￿ ￿dij +
￿
2







+ wij + ln(PiPj)
￿￿1 ; (38)
where Dk = 1 if country k is ￿ developing￿ , and ￿
0 is the additional logistics coe¢ cient. Analogous to
MR
logistics
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where DL = 1
n
P
l DlLl: Then, as above,















+ wij + ￿MR
f
ij: (39)
A priori, we have technical econometric concerns regarding high-income exporters. First, as part of
the HMR procedure, very high values of ^ ￿ij can be predicted for many country pairs such that they
are practically indistinguishable from unity and from one another. HMR truncate the values of ^ ￿ij that
are greater than 0:9999999 at that value. As a result, there is a mass of estimates of ￿ij and zij at a
particular value. Baranga (2009) notes that a seemingly innocuous truncation can have a very big impact
on estimates of ￿. He speculates this may have been done to ensure ^ ￿ comfortably exceeds zero, which
is required for a well-de￿ned gravity model. Preliminary analysis revealed that all our predicted values
above 0:9999999 were generated by high-income exporters and that high-income countries generally gen-
erated high predicted probabilities. Rather than being stuck with indistinguishable values or truncating
arbitrarily, we remove a well de￿ned group of countries, namely high-income exporters. Second, including
logistics and its interaction with the income level means we have two potentially endogenous variables
for which instruments must be found. This places a greater demand on the instrumentation procedure.
Turning to the results, Column 1 of Table A2 presents the OLS results for a homogeneous ￿rms model
with MR controls. It now includes a dummy equal to one if the exporter is classi￿ed as a high income
28country and an interaction between logistics and income level which applies only to developing countries
as in equation (39). This produces a higher logistics coe¢ cient than the analogous estimate in Table 2
together with insigni￿cant estimates for the income dummy and interaction. The insigni￿cance may be
due to high multicolinearity - the variance in￿ ation factors for the income dummy and the interaction are
118 and 72 respectively - but could imply that income level makes no di⁄erence. However, the coe¢ cient
is di⁄erent to that for developing countries estimated alone. This may be in part to di⁄erent coe¢ cient
estimates for the other trade costs variables. In other words, fully isolating separate developing country
e⁄ects may require a number of interactions with income for a large number of trade cost variables and
not just logistics. IV estimates are unreliable. Using the sum of start-up procedures in both exporter and
importer as one instrument and their product as another - as done before - yields very poor identi￿cation
of the coe¢ cients of interest. They are all individually insigni￿cant, but the.coe¢ cients imply logistics
quality reduces exports in rich countries and has a huge positive impact on developing country exports.
Moving onto the heterogeneous ￿rms model, we present two estimates where the bilateral component
of the Samecountry variable is excluded. Column 4 controls for country and ￿rm selection. The estimates
implied for developing countries are individually insigni￿cant but jointly signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Compared to the speci￿cation controlling for country and ￿rm selection for developing countries, this
assigns a relatively greater role to the intensive margin and a smaller role to the extensive margin. As
was the case for developing countries only, speci￿cations controlling for country and ￿rm selection were
not robust to the choice of excluded variable. Unlike the developing country estimates, there is a large
and negatively signi￿cant IMR term. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that attempting to control
only for ￿rm-selection yields nonsensical results. Most importantly, it produces a negative delta term,
which is theoretically inconsistent and precludes the calculation of country-level comparative statics.
While we ave provided estimates based on the exclusion of the Samecountry variable for consistency
and brevity, we stress that these results are representative of a range of alternative speci￿cations, in-
cluding those which exclude the bilateral component of the trade cost, alternative excluded variables
and specifying a reduced-form interaction of Dj(Li + Lj) instead of our theoretically derived estimates
and speci￿cations which exclude the high_income dummy to reduce colinearity. We also tried a number
of alternative instrument combinations and functional forms for the IV estimates. These consistently
yielded poorly identi￿ed results as well as negative delta coe¢ cients or IMR terms.
We additionally estimated speci￿cations on the full sample without the income dummy or interactions.
The results were more plausible for the IV estimates but equally untrustworthy for the heterpgeneous
￿rms models. Furthermore, the OLS coe¢ cient on logistics (0:876) was higher than that for the analogous
developing country estimate.
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1  2  3  4 
OLS  OLS MR  IV 1  IV 2 
GDP  0.987***  0.922***  0.951***  0.904*** 
[0.0161]  [0.0157]  [0.0274]  [0.0295]    
Logistics (ILI)  0.606***  0.597***  0.437**  0.697*** 
[0.0566]  [0.0556]  [0.138]  [0.151]    
Distance ‐ 1.437*** ‐ 1.467*** ‐ 1.456*** ‐ 1.474*** 
[0.0437]  [0.0496]  [0.0500]  [0.0501]    
Border  1.491***  1.071***  1.066***  1.074*** 
[0.166]  [0.176]  [0.176]  [0.176]    
Colony  0.653***  0.501***  0.491***  0.508*** 
[0.116]  [0.133]  [0.134]  [0.134]    
Language  0.651***  0.646***  0.648***  0.645*** 
[0.0769]  [0.0956]  [0.0956]  [0.0955]    
Samecountry  0.403*  0.398  0.416*  0.387 
[0.227]  [0.243]  [0.244]  [0.243]    
Religion  0.122  0.826***  0.820***  0.829*** 
[0.107]  [0.143]  [0.142]  [0.143]    
Landlocked ‐ 0.752*** ‐ 0.648*** ‐ 0.635*** ‐ 0.656*** 
[0.0651]  [0.0653]  [0.0657]  [0.0659]    
Island ‐ 0.00127 ‐ 0.410*** ‐ 0.393*** ‐ 0.421*** 
[0.0702]  [0.0694]  [0.0700]  [0.0697]    
Constant ‐ 24.11*** ‐ 33.18*** ‐ 33.66*** ‐ 32.89*** 
   [0.695]  [0.602]  [0.704]  [0.724]    
N  6939  6939  6939  6939 














GDP  0.244***  0.941***  0.679***  0.868***  0.840*** 
[0.00937]  [0.0183]  [0.135]  [0.0477]  [0.0462]   
Logistics (ILI)  0.483***  0.636***  0.123  0.489***  0.445*** 
[0.0342]  [0.0704]  [0.273]  [0.105]  [0.0948]   
Distance ‐ 0.635*** ‐ 1.520*** ‐ 0.842** ‐ 1.314*** ‐ 1.270*** 
[0.0374]  [0.0463]  [0.365]  [0.141]  [0.128]   
Border  0.175  1.162***  0.881***  1.020***  1.059*** 
[0.175]  [0.163]  [0.215]  [0.172]  [0.184]   
Colony  0.152**  0.563***  0.365**  0.478***  0.499*** 
[0.0689]  [0.146]  [0.160]  [0.121]  [0.143]   
Language  0.418***  0.680***  0.247  0.550***  0.527*** 
[0.0598]  [0.0944]  [0.254]  [0.112]  [0.115]   
Samecountry  0.489** ‐ 4.123***  0.281 ‐ 3.961**  
[0.196]  [1.367]  [0.258]  [1.566]   
Religion  0.316***  0.853***  0.541***  0.759***  0.751*** 
[0.0865]  [0.141]  [0.204]  [0.167]  [0.146]   
Landlocked ‐ 0.121*** ‐ 0.657*** ‐ 0.523*** ‐ 0.622*** ‐ 0.603*** 
[0.0296]  [0.0582]  [0.105]  [0.0796]  [0.0791]   
Island  0.0685* ‐ 0.408*** ‐ 0.522*** ‐ 0.427*** ‐ 0.477*** 
[0.0404]  [0.0667]  [0.0688]  [0.0651]  [0.0737]   
Constant ‐ 13.32*** ‐ 34.38*** ‐ 19.05*** ‐ 29.45*** ‐ 27.94*** 
[0.385]  [0.982]  [7.344]  [2.425]  [2.303]   
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.273 ‐ 0.725              
[0.229]  [0.585]              
Delta  1.053*  0.307  0.416* 
         [0.558]  [0.241]  [0.225]   
N  9350  6939  6939  6939  6939 












mean  p25  p50  p75  sd  min  max 





Exporter  Share  Homogeneous  Heterogeneous  Exporter  Share  Homogeneous  Heterogeneous 
China  5.34%  3.50  3.93  Ethiopia  0.03%  0.020  0.026 
Brazil  1.90%  1.29  1.53  Bolivia  0.03%  0.019  0.023 
India  1.82%  1.24  1.45  Uganda  0.02%  0.015  0.021 
Mexico  1.81%  1.23  1.35  Jamaica  0.02%  0.017  0.021 
Russian  0.99%  0.68  0.81  Paraguay  0.02%  0.017  0.021 
Argentina  0.89%  0.61  0.72  Ghana  0.02%  0.013  0.017 
Turkey  0.70%  0.48  0.56  Honduras  0.02%  0.014  0.016 
Indonesia  0.59%  0.41  0.47  Senegal  0.02%  0.011  0.015 
Poland  0.56%  0.39  0.44  Nepal  0.02%  0.012  0.015 
South Africa  0.45%  0.31  0.37  Mozambique  0.02%  0.011  0.015 
Thailand  0.45%  0.31  0.35  Mauritius  0.02%  0.011  0.014 
Iran  0.38%  0.26  0.31  Gabon  0.02%  0.011  0.014 
Egypt  0.35%  0.24  0.29  Zimbabwe  0.02%  0.011  0.014 
Venezuela  0.37%  0.26  0.29  Cambodia  0.01%  0.010  0.012 
Malaysia  0.32%  0.22  0.25  Albania  0.01%  0.009  0.011 
Colombia  0.28%  0.19  0.22  Madagascar  0.01%  0.009  0.011 
Pakistan  0.26%  0.18  0.22  Zambia  0.01%  0.008  0.011 
Chile  0.27%  0.18  0.22  Nicaragua  0.01%  0.009  0.011 
Philippines  0.26%  0.18  0.21  Guinea  0.01%  0.007  0.010 
Algeria  0.19%  0.13  0.16  Burkina  0.01%  0.007  0.010 
Peru  0.18%  0.13  0.15  Mali  0.01%  0.006  0.010 
Bangladesh  0.17%  0.12  0.14  Haiti  0.01%  0.007  0.009 
Nigeria  0.16%  0.11  0.13  P. New Guinea  0.01%  0.007  0.009 
Hungary  0.16%  0.11  0.13  Benin  0.01%  0.005  0.008 
Romania  0.14%  0.10  0.11  Chad  0.01%  0.005  0.007 
Vietnam  0.13%  0.09  0.10  Rwanda  0.01%  0.005  0.007 
Morocco  0.12%  0.08  0.10  Niger  0.01%  0.004  0.006 
Tunisia  0.07%  0.05  0.06  Lao  0.01%  0.005  0.006 
Syrian  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Malawi  0.01%  0.004  0.006 
Uruguay  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Togo  0.00%  0.003  0.004 
Dominican  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Mauritania  0.00%  0.003  0.004 
Lebanon  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Sierra  0.00%  0.002  0.004 
Guatemala  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Mongolia  0.00%  0.002  0.003 
Sri Lanka  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Burundi  0.00%  0.002  0.002 
Ecuador  0.06%  0.04  0.05  Guyana  0.00%  0.001  0.002 
Costa Rica  0.05%  0.04  0.04  Djibouti  0.00%  0.001  0.002 
Sudan  0.05%  0.03  0.04  Gambia  0.00%  0.001  0.002 
Bulgaria  0.05%  0.03  0.04  Liberia  0.00%  0.001  0.001 
Kenya  0.04%  0.03  0.04  Solomon  0.00%  0.001  0.001 
Angola  0.04%  0.03  0.04  Guinea‐Bissau  0.00%  0.000  0.001 
Tanzania  0.04%  0.02  0.03  Comoros  0.00%  0.000  0.001 
Panama  0.04%  0.03  0.03  MEAN  0.23%  0.16  0.18 




Yemen  0.04%  0.02  0.03 
Cameroon  0.03%  0.02  0.03 
Jordan  0.03%  0.02  0.03 




Country  ILI  LPI  Country  ILI  LPI  Country  ILI  LPI 
Rwanda  1.90  1.77  Gambia  2.52  2.52  Saudi Arabia  3.14  3.02 
Djibouti  1.99  1.94  Malawi  2.52  2.42  Indonesia  3.17  3.01 
Sierra  2.04  1.95  Egypt  2.52  2.37  Poland  3.19  3.04 
Gabon  2.10  2.10  Morocco  2.53  2.38  Turkey  3.26  3.15 
Albania  2.11  2.08  Iran  2.55  2.51  Hungary  3.26  3.15 
Chad  2.11  1.98  P. New Guinea  2.55  2.38  Czech Rep.  3.28  3.13 
Niger  2.14  1.97  Ethiopia  2.56  2.33  Israel  3.34  3.21 
Solomon Islands  2.16  2.08  Angola  2.59  2.48  Chile  3.40  3.25 
Guyana  2.18  2.05  Bangladesh  2.60  2.47  China  3.42  3.32 
Algeria  2.20  2.06  Uganda  2.61  2.49  Thailand  3.43  3.31 
Tanzania  2.20  2.08  Cambodia  2.61  2.50  Greece  3.52  3.36 
Mauritius  2.25  2.13  Uruguay  2.62  2.51  Portugal  3.57  3.38 
Syrian  2.26  2.09  Benin  2.63  2.45  South Korea  3.61  3.52 
Burundi  2.26  2.29  Honduras  2.63  2.50  Spain  3.61  3.52 
Mongolia  2.26  2.08  Colombia  2.63  2.50  Malaysia  3.63  3.48 
Togo  2.28  2.25  Paraguay  2.64  2.57  South Africa  3.66  3.53 
Nepal  2.29  2.14  Costa Rica  2.68  2.55  Italy  3.68  3.58 
Ghana  2.31  2.16  Guatemala  2.70  2.53  France  3.85  3.76 
Nicaragua  2.31  2.21  Ecuador  2.71  2.60  New Zealand  3.87  3.75 
Haiti  2.31  2.21  Cameroon  2.72  2.49  United States  3.89  3.84 
Lao PDR  2.36  2.25  Venezuela  2.72  2.62  Finland  3.91  3.82 
Burkina Faso  2.38  2.24  Pakistan  2.73  2.62  Norway  3.92  3.81 
Mozambique  2.38  2.29  Kenya  2.74  2.52  Australia  3.94  3.79 
Madagascar  2.39  2.24  Brazil  2.78  2.75  Belgium  3.96  3.89 
Jamaica  2.40  2.25  Mauritania  2.78  2.63  Denmark  3.98  3.86 
Senegal  2.40  2.37  El Salvador  2.83  2.66  Canada  4.04  3.92 
Guinea‐Bissau  2.41  2.28  Sudan  2.84  2.71  Ireland  4.06  3.91 
Yemen  2.41  2.29  Philippines  2.87  2.69  United Kingdom  4.08  3.99 
Cote d'Ivoire  2.44  2.36  Guinea  2.88  2.71  Japan  4.09  4.02 
Russian Fed.  2.44  2.37  Peru  2.91  2.77  Switzerland  4.10  4.02 
Bolivia  2.46  2.31  Tunisia  2.92  2.76  Hong Kong  4.10  4.00 
Mali  2.46  2.29  Mexico  3.01  2.87  Austria  4.16  4.06 
Zimbabwe  2.46  2.29  Jordan  3.01  2.89  Germany  4.16  4.10 
Lebanon  2.48  2.37  Jordan  3.02  2.89  Sweden  4.18  4.08 
Zambia  2.50  2.37  Bulgaria  3.04  2.87  Netherlands  4.25  4.18 
Comoros  2.51  2.48  Romania  3.05  2.91  Singapore  4.28  4.19 
Nigeria  2.51  2.40  Kuwait  3.08  2.99  Table A1: Logistics Performance Index 
(LPI) and International Logistics Index 
(ILI) by country. 
Liberia  2.51  2.31  Vietnam  3.09  2.89 
Sri Lanka  2.51  2.40  Argentina  3.10  2.98 









GDP  0.866***  0.245  0.689***  0.933*** 
[0.0123]  [1.100]  [0.118]  [0.0362]    
Logistics (ILI)  0.840*** ‐ 1.119  0.282  1.203*** 
[0.0864]  [5.462]  [0.466]  [0.183]    
Logistics_developing  0.158  8.369  0.347 ‐ 0.0744 
[0.102]  [16.77]  [0.252]  [0.144]    
Distance  ‐1.363*** ‐ 1.418*** ‐ 0.979*** ‐ 1.588*** 
[0.0372]  [0.112]  [0.294]  [0.101]    
Border  0.795***  0.840***  0.718***  1.027*** 
[0.149]  [0.257]  [0.202]  [0.164]    
Colony  0.300***  0.375*  0.23  0.414*** 
[0.116]  [0.216]  [0.151]  [0.127]    
Language  0.713***  0.798***  0.449**  0.835*** 
[0.0726]  [0.195]  [0.194]  [0.0723]    
Samecountry  0.633***  0.521 ‐ 3.901*** ‐ 3.683*** 
[0.226]  [0.380]  [1.215]  [1.329]    
Religion  0.634***  0.528**  0.409**  0.740*** 
[0.111]  [0.261]  [0.180]  [0.0894]    
Landlocked  ‐0.550*** ‐ 0.26 ‐ 0.477*** ‐ 0.564*** 
[0.0498]  [0.582]  [0.0601]  [0.0534]    
Island  ‐0.400***  0.0931 ‐ 0.483*** ‐ 0.410*** 
[0.0484]  [1.067]  [0.0599]  [0.0533]    
High_income  0.44  26.63  1.062 ‐ 0.376 
[0.369]  [54.68]  [0.871]  [0.513]    
Constant  ‐32.56*** ‐ 36.88*** ‐ 21.42*** ‐ 34.88*** 




         [0.474]  [0.162]    
N  10057  10057  10057  10057 
adj. R‐sq  0.679  0.324  0.68  0.68 
Table A2: Gravity regression results for full sample of countries. Significance levels: * 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Std errors in brackets (bootstrapped in columns 3‐4). 
Column 1 is estimated by OLS. Column 2 uses two instruments.   Column 3 follows the 
HMR procedure with the exclusion of the bilateral component of the same country 
variable (the MR component is included). Column 4 excludes the bilateral component of 
the same country variable and the Inverse Mills Ratio. 
 
 